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QUESTION PRESENTED
Amicus curiae will address the following question:
Whether the Oregon Supreme Court correctly applied law
and economics principles – specifically, deterrence theory –
in affirming the punitive damage award in this case, or
whether it mistakenly approved an irrational and excessive
punitive damages judgment.
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
Amici are law professors who specialize in law and
economics, and university scholars who specialize in
economic theory. Each has used law and economics theories
and principles in writing about or studying recurrent
controversies concerning punitive damages awards. Amici
have an interest in providing the Court with an accurate
assessment of how those principles apply to the award in
this case. Short biographical sketches of each individual
amicus follow.
Amicus Keith N. Hylton is the Paul J. Liacos Scholar
in Law and a Professor of Law at Boston University School
of Law (BUSL), where he has taught courses in antitrust,
labor law, and torts since 1995. He is an honors graduate of
Harvard College and the Harvard Law School, and earned a
Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). He joined the BUSL faculty after
teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern
University School of Law. Widely recognized in the area of
law and economics, he has published more than 50 articles
in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and
economics journals, including Punitive Damages and the
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L. J. 421 (1998). His
textbook, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION, was published by Cambridge
University Press in 2003. He has served as the Editor of the
TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND INSURANCE LAW ABSTRACTS
journal since 1999, is Co-Editor of COMPETITION POLICY
INTERNATIONAL, and is a current member of the American
Law Institute (ALI). He also is a former director of the
American Law and Economics Association (ALEA), a former
1 The parties have filed blanket written consents with the Clerk to the
filing of amicus briefs in this case. This brief was not authored in whole or
in part by counsel for a party, and no person or entity, other than the
amici curiae, their members, and their counsel made a monetary
contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.
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chair of the Section on Torts and Compensation Systems of
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), a former
chair of the AALS’ Section on Antitrust and Economic
Regulation, a former Secretary of the American Bar
Association’s Section on Employment and Labor Law, and a
former member of the editorial board of the JOURNAL OF
LEGAL EDUCATION.
Amicus Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt is the Associate
Dean for Research and the Willard and Margaret Carr
Professor of Labor and Employment Law at the Indiana
University School of Law.
Since joining the Indiana
University School of Law faculty in 1997, Professor DauSchmidt has taught an advanced seminar in law and
economics and courses in antitrust, labor and employment
law, and employee benefits law. Professor Dau-Schmidt
received his bachelor’s degree from the University of
Wisconsin, Phi Beta Kappa, and earned master’s and law
degrees (Order of the Coif), and a Ph.D. from the University
of Michigan. Prior to joining the Indiana University School
of Law faculty, he taught at the University of Wisconsin Law
School. Professor Dau-Schmidt is a nationally recognized
scholar. He has published more than fifty articles, chapters,
and book reviews, on subjects ranging from labor and
employment law to the economic analysis of legal problems,
including Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices: The Economic
Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW &
ECONOMICS: NEW & CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (R. Malloy & C.
Brun, Eds.). His scholarship has appeared in the Duke Law
Journal and the law reviews of the University of Texas, and
the University of Wisconsin, among many others. In 1991,
he received the Scholarly Paper Award from the Association
of American Law Schools for his work on the economic
analysis of the criminal law as a preference-shaping policy.
He also received awards from the School of Law for teaching
excellence in 1998 and in 2003. Professor Dau-Schmidt was
elected to the National Council of the American Association
of University Professors (1993-96) and was appointed to
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serve on both the Executive Committee (1994-96) and
Litigation Committee (1993-02) of that organization.
Professor Dau-Schmidt has served on the Executive
Committee of the Association of American Law Schools’
section on Labor and Employment Law (1990-91), the
Industrial Relations Research Association’s section on Labor
and Employment Law (1998-99), and the Labor Law Group
(2000-03). He has also served as the chair for the Association
of American Law Schools’ section on Law and Socioeconomics (2002-03) and on that section’s Executive
Committee (2000-03).
Amicus Mark F. Grady is Professor of Law and
Director of the Center for Law and Economics at the
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law (“UCLA
School of Law”). Professor Grady’s research focuses on law
and economics and he teaches torts, antitrust, and
intellectual property at UCLA School of Law. He received
his A.B. degree in Economics (1970) and his J.D. (1973) from
UCLA. He held postdoctoral fellowships in law and
economics at the University of Chicago Law School (1977)
and the Yale Law School (1982). Professor Grady began his
academic career at the University of Iowa School of Law,
after working for the Federal Trade Commission and the
United States Senate.
In 1985, Professor Grady was
appointed Professor of Law at Northwestern University. In
the spring of 1990, he became the first John M. Olin visiting
Professor of Law and Economics at Duke Law School. In
1992, he returned to UCLA to become Professor of Law. In
1997, he took leave from UCLA to become the third dean of
the George Mason University School of Law, University
Professor of Law, Chairman of the Law and Economics
Center, and Principal Investigator of the law school’s
federally funded Critical Infrastructure Protection Project,
which he founded. After a successful tenure at George
Mason, Professor Grady returned to UCLA in 2004.
Professor Grady is a founding trustee of the American Law
and Economics Association and the author of numerous
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books and articles on torts, intellectual property, antitrust,
law and economics, and law and biology, including articles
published in the Supreme Court Economic Review, the law
reviews of the University of Virginia and the University of
Pennsylvania, and A New Positive Economic Theory of
Negligence, published in the Yale Law Journal. He has served
as a consultant to President Ronald Reagan, presented policy
papers at President William J. Clinton’s White House,
lectured to federal judges, given seminars to Congressional
staff members, and testified to Congressional committees.
Amicus Jeffrey L. Harrison is Stephen C. O'Connell
Chair and Professor of Law at the University of Florida
College of Law, where he has taught Law & Economics,
Antitrust, Contract, and Regulated Industries since 1983.
From 1994 to 1999 he served as the Chesterfield Smith
Professor of Law at the Law School. He received his Ph.D.
in Economics and Business Administration from the
University of Florida in 1970, and his J.D. from the
University of North Carolina Law School in 1978, where
served on the Law Review, won High Honors, and was
awarded Order of the Coif. He is widely recognized in the
field of Law and Economics and is the author of seven books
and monographs (including LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES (2002);
ANTITRUST
AND
ITS
ECONOMIC
UNDERSTANDING
IMPLICATIONS (4d ed., Matthew Bender, 2003) (with E.T.
Sullivan); REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2d ed. West,
1903) (with Morgan and Verkuil); MONOPSONY: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND ANTITRUST POLICY (Princeton Univ. Press.,
1993) (with R. Blair); and ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BUSINESS: CASES AND MATERIALS (West, 2d ed. 1985) (with
Morgan and Verkuil). He is also the author of more than 40
law review or juried articles, comments, and book reviews,
including articles published in the Michigan Law Review,
Northwestern Law Review, Cornell Law Review, Yale
Journal on Regulation, Northwestern Journal on Regulation,
George Washington Law Review, UCLA Law Review,
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Wisconsin Law Review, Vanderbilt Law Review, the Journal
of the Economics of Business, Journal of Law & Social
Inquiry, and Antitrust Bulletin. He is a former Member of
the Board of Editors of Law & Society Review and a former
Chair of Association of American Law School's Section on
Socioeconomics and the Law.
Amicus Mark G. Kelman is the William Nelson
Cromwell Professor of Law and Vice Dean of Stanford Law
School.
Professor Kelman has taught courses on
antidiscrimination law, including race and the law, criminal
law and justice, distributive justice, employment
discrimination, and property. In addition to being a longtime professor and researcher, Professor Kelman also has
served as the academic coordinator, and academic associate
dean of Stanford Law School. Before joining the Stanford
Law School faculty in 1977, Professor Kelman was the
director of Criminal Justice Projects for the Fund for the City
of New York. Professor Kelman received a bachelor of arts
degree from Harvard College in Social Studies, summa cum
laude and Phi Beta Kappa. He received his law degree from
Harvard Law School, magna cum laude. Professor Kelman is
a prolific scholar whose jurisprudential interests range from
law and economics to cognitive psychology. He has
published several books, including A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES (Harvard U.P. 1987), portions of which were
reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
LAW, and STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN
REGULATION & TAXATION (U. Michigan P., 1999). He is also
the author of numerous articles, published in peer review
journals such as Philosophy & Public Affairs and in the
Journal of Legal Studies, and in the law reviews of Stanford
University, the University of Virginia, and the University of
Southern California, among others. His scholarly articles
include Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law
and Macroeconomics, and Problematic Perhaps, But Not
Irrational, both of which were published in the Stanford Law
Review.
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Amicus Thomas S. Ulen is Swanlund Chair and
Director, Illinois Program in Law and Economics at the
University of Illinois College of Law. Professor Ulen also is
a research affiliate of the Environmental Council, a member
of the Campus Honors faculty, and holds positions in the
Department of Economics and the Institute for Government
and Public Affairs. Professor Ulen received a bachelor’s
degree from Dartmouth College, a master’s degree from St.
Catherine’s College, Oxford, and a Ph.D. in Economics from
Stanford University. Professor Ulen has served as a Visiting
Professor at the University of Bielefeld, and as the Foreign
Chair in International and Comparative Law at the
University of Ghent, Belgium. He has also been a Visiting
Professor in Belgium, Germany, Slovenia, and a Ford
Foundation Professor in Shanghai, China. Professor Ulen’s
scholarship has examined a variety of issues related to
economics, legal scholarship, and legal education, and has
appeared in the law reviews of the University of Michigan
and New York University, among others. His numerous
publications include Economic and Public Choice Forces in
Federalism, George Mason Law Review, and The Growing
Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law
Review. His book LAW AND ECONOMICS (with Robert
Cooter), now in its fourth edition, has been translated into
Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, Korean, French, and Russian. A
prolific writer and researcher, Professor Ulen has
contributed four entries—on regulation generally, quantity
regulation, price regulation, and quality regulation—for the
OXFORD ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES and a
chapter for LAW AND IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco
Parisi, ed., University of Chicago Press, 2003). Professor
Ulen has served as a member of the editorial board of
several professional journals and was a member of the
founding Board of Directors of the American Law and
Economics Association.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no dispute that the punitive damages award
that was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case
satisfies the most rigorous law and economic standards for
rationality. The Court need not credit the analysis of the
undersigned amici on this score; the fact that Petitioner’s
own amici – most notably law and economics scholars A.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell – have been unable to
find anything economically amiss in the decision below
speaks volumes. 2 To be sure, Professors Polinsky and
Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of Philip
Morris in this case, just as they filed one in support of the
Petitioner in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408 (2003). 3
Significantly, however, unlike the Polinsky-Shavell
brief in State Farm, which repeatedly asserted that the Utah
Supreme Court’s decision in that case was fundamentally
“irrational,” 4 Professors Polinsky and Shavell have found
nothing to criticize about the decision below, nothing at all.
Instead of criticizing that decision as irrational and the
award upheld by the court below as excessive and as an
example of overdeterrence, the only thing Professors
Polinsky and Shavell find fault with in this case are the
arguments advanced by plaintiff’s counsel – which they
concede were “eschewed” by the court below 5 – regarding
2 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the
Cato Institute in Support of the Petitioner, in Philip Morris v. Williams, No.
05-1256.
3 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and
the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation in Support of Petitioner, in
State Farm v. Campbell, No. 01-1289.
4

Id. at 3, 5, and 14.

5 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and
the Cato Institute in Support of the Petitioner, in Philip Morris v. Williams,
No. 05-1256, at 3.
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the use of “Philip Morris’s wealth as a basis for upholding
the punitive damages.” 6 Thus Professors Polinsky and
Shavell state that
Although the Oregon Supreme Court
eschewed reliance on Philip Morris’ wealth as
a basis for upholding the punitive damages,
the plaintiff consistently relied on it in
arguing that the punitive award was not
excessive. Because she can be expected to do
so again in this Court and because the issue of
the proper role of corporate financial
condition [sic] is an important and recurring
one, amici believe that addressing that issue
may be of assistance to the Court. 7
Amici agree with Professors Polinsky and Shavell that the
question of what role a defendant’s wealth should play in
calculating punitive damages awards is both an important
and a recurrent problem. Amici further agree that it would
be inappropriate for a court to rely solely on a tortfeasor’s
wealth in determining the appropriate size of a punitive
damages award. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Oregon
Supreme Court did not rely on Philip Morris’s wealth, to
any degree, in undertaking its de novo review of the jury’s
award of punitive damages in this case, Professors Polinsky
and Shavell have not identified and we have not found any
reason in law and economics theory and practice to overturn
the decision below.
ARGUMENT
Like the Utah Supreme Court in State Farm, the
Oregon Supreme Court relied on deterrence-based
arguments in upholding a large punitive damages award in
this case. Because many of the deterrence theory issues here
6

Id.

7

Id.

9
are the same as those addressed in the State Farm litigation, 8
amici will review the areas of deterrence theory that are noncontroversial and briefly touch on one topic of controversy
that has been raised by the Polinsky-Shavell brief filed in
this case.
Punitive damage awards have been justified for
many years on the grounds that they deter and punish the
perpetrators of harmful conduct. Punishment, with its roots
in vengeance, is the oldest rationale for the law,9 serving as a
ready justification for the cruelest punishments of ancient
legal systems. The theory of deterrence is a comparatively
modern development that has served primarily as a set of
rigorous arguments for putting limits on penalties. For this
reason, amici will focus on the theory of deterrence, because
the punishment goal generally supports penalties at least as
severe as those suggested by deterrence theory.
As amici hope to make clear in this brief, the
economic theory of deterrence supports the approach taken
by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case. Indeed, even the
views expressed by Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 10
Petitioner’s deterrence theory experts, provide ample
support for the Oregon appellate court’s decision. The
silence of Professors Polinsky and Shavell on two of the
major issues presented in the Petition for Certiorari –
whether punitive awards can aim to strip a tortfeasor’s illicit
Compare Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, in State Farm v. Campbell, No. 01-1289, with Brief Amicus
Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the Citizens for a
Sound Economy Foundation in Support of Petitioner, in State Farm v.
Campbell, No. 1289. Amici’s views on punitive awards have been set out in
Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
GEO. L. J. 421 (1998); Keith N. Hylton and Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort
Damages Be Multiplied? 21 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005).
8

9

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW (1881), at 2-15.

10 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
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gains and whether harms to individuals other than the
plaintiff can be taken into account in determining the
appropriate level of punitive damages – is deafening, for
they have argued in support of both approaches in their
academic writing on punitive damages. 11
I.

DETERRENCE THEORY SUPPORTS THE IMPOSITION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CERTAIN TORT CASES.

The theory of deterrence has been developed over
200 years, starting with the publication of Italian social
philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
in 1764. Writing at a time when torture and capital
punishment were common responses to crimes of all types,
from murder and rape to begging without a license or
stealing letters, 12 Beccaria argued that penalties should be
set at a level that removes the prospect of profit or gain from the
11 Id. at 887-900 (arguing, quite forcefully, for multiplying damages to
take into account losses imposed on individuals other than the plaintiff);
and at 907-07 & n.120, 918 n.154 (supporting gain elimination goal).

See E. P. Thompson, WHIGS AND HUNTERS : THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK
ACT (1975) The Black Act (9 Geo. 1 c. 22), was enacted by the British
Parliament in 1723 during the reign of King George I in response to the
Waltham deer poachers and a group of bandits known as the
“Wokingham Blacks.” It made it a felony, i.e., a hanging offence, to
appear armed in a park or warren, or to hunt or steal deer, with the face
blackened or disguised. The Act was later amended to deal with
protestors outside the royal forests and chases, becoming a brutal adjunct
to the Riot Act of 1715. Both statutes were part of the “Bloody Code,” a
system of laws and punishments in England from the 1700s to the mid1800s. Although it was not called the Bloody Code in its own time, the
name was given later because many felonies, including stealing anything
worth 5 shillings (25p) or more, stealing letters, poaching, impersonating a
Chelsea Pensioner, cutting down young trees, begging without a license if
you were a soldier or sailor, being in the company of gypsies for a month,
“strong evidence of malice” in children 7-14 years old, and at least 200
additional offenses were punishable by execution. The punishments were
unusually harsh at this time because the laws were made by wealthy
landowners who wanted to protect their property. It was thought that the
best method for deterring crime was to make people too afraid of the
punishments to commit crimes.
12

11
offender, and not much above that level. 13 Beccaria feared
that if penalties were made unreasonably harsh, they would
encourage harsh conduct on the part of offenders, perhaps
by setting an example that implicitly approves the very
cruelty the law aimed to suppress.
Since Beccaria, deterrence theory has largely
involved refinements and qualifications of this basic
economic approach.
Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth
century English philosopher, introduced the notion of
marginal deterrence as a reason for keeping penalties close
the gain-eliminating level. 14
The theory of marginal
deterrence favors modesty in setting penalties in order to
avoid giving an incentive to the offender to choose the most
harmful of a set of possible actions. For example, if the state
imposes the death penalty for purse-snatching, pursesnatchers would have an incentive to murder their victims
because it would lower the likelihood of being caught and
have no effect on the final penalty. On the other hand, a
more moderate penalty for purse-snatching could deter
purse-snatching and at least make it within the pursesnatcher’s interests to do no more than steal his victim’s
purse.
The next major refinement of the theory of deterrence
was a 1968 law review article by University of Chicago
economist (and Nobel laureate) Gary S. Becker 15 Becker

13 Cesare Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 43-44 (Henry
Paolucci, ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963). Indeed, England’s “Bloody Code” died
out in the mid-ninetieth century because judges and juries thought that
punishments were too harsh for many of the criminals, so they became
less inclined to find them guilty in court. Because the lawmakers still
wanted punishments to deter potential criminals, but needed them to
become less harsh, transportation across the seas (typically to Australia
became the more common punishment.
14

Jeremy Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
181-84 (Prometheus Books 1998)(1781).

OR

MORALS

AND LEGISLATION
15

Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
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argued in favor of replacing Beccaria’s and Bentham’s gaineliminating penalties with “cost-internalizing” penalties for
activities that cause harm, but, on balance, are socially useful
or economically beneficial. Cost-internalizing penalties, as
the term suggests, shift or internalize to the offender the
losses his conduct imposes on society. If the offender gains
$100 from committing an offensive act that imposes a $10
loss on his victim, the cost internalization approach would
require a penalty of $10, while the gain elimination approach
would require a minimum penalty of $100.
Cost-internalizing
penalties
are
especially
appropriate, in Becker’s view, with respect to activities for
which the offender’s gain exceeds the likely loss of the
victim, which is true of many economically beneficial
activities that cause harms. Under Becker’s scheme, an
activity for which the gain exceeds the likely loss would
have an incentive to continue under the cost internalization
approach. Becker’s approach is particularly useful in areas
such as torts or antitrust, in which courts award damages to
victims injured by activities that are socially desirable
overall. But Becker also argued that if the offender’s likely
gain is less than or equal to the victim’s likely loss, which is
true of simple crimes such as theft, the optimal approach is
to strip the offender of any and all gains. Nevertheless,
because the cost internalizing penalty would have this effect
anyway, Becker found this to provide additional support for
cost internalization as a general approach.
Another important innovation in the economic
theory of deterrence can be traced to an article by Yale Law
Professor (now Judge) Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed on “property rules and liability rules” 16 and an
article by University of Chicago Law (now Judge) Professor
16 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
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Richard A. Posner on the economics of criminal law. 17 The
fundamental insight from these articles and decisions is that
when market transactions are easily carried out, gain
eliminating penalties are preferable in order to encourage
use of the market. 18
Summing up, the economic theory of deterrence
distinguishes two approaches: gain elimination and cost
internalization.
Gain elimination is appropriate when
market transactions are easily arranged, or when the
conduct is virtually always socially undesirable such as
theft. Cost internalization, on the other hand, is preferable
when market transactions are difficult to arrange and the
activity of the offender is generally socially beneficial.
Gain elimination is equivalent to a policy of complete
deterrence, of aiming to reduce the frequency of the
wrongdoer’s injurious activities to zero. Without attempting
to calculate costs and benefits, it is immediately intuitive
that there are some acts that should be completely
discouraged, such as fraud, theft, rape, and murder. There
is no optimal degree of fraud or murder that society should
wish to encourage.
Cost internalization is equivalent to a policy of
resource management. The offender’s conduct may have
been harmful to a particular victim, but society should not
set out to completely shut down the offender or wholly ban
its activities. For example, a railroad may cause enormous
damage to nearby farmers by spitting sparks onto their
fields and thereby igniting their crops. But society benefits
greatly from railroads and has no interest in setting penalties
17 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193 (1985).
18 Judge Calabresi recently expanded upon this and related themes in
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 993 (2000), as did Judge Posner in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging,
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-78 (7th Cir. 2003)
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that entirely eliminate the profits from rail service. Cost
internalizing penalties, on the other hand, will provide
railroads with incentives to find the optimal level of activity
– the level at which the gains to society are at a maximum.
The economic theory of deterrence has clear
implications for three issues at the core of this case: whether
damages should be limited in a case in which the
defendant’s conduct is reprehensible, whether the harm to
people other than the plaintiff should be taken into account
in setting a punitive award, and the role of the defendant’s
profits or wealth in determining a punitive award.
II.

THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES ARE ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL IN CASES
IN WHICH THE
DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT IS
REPREHENSIBLE.

Reprehensible conduct is social or economic behavior
that society has no rational interest in encouraging or
allowing to persist to any degree. Although there may be
limits in the amount of public resources society may be
willing to invest in the apprehension of purse-snatchers or
the detection of fraud, there is no optimal amount of pursesnatching, and no optimal amount of fraud. The optimal
scale of such reprehensible conduct is zero. As to this
proposition, there is no disagreement in the economic
literature on deterrence.
This implies that the proper goal of a punishment
authority in the context of reprehensible conduct is complete
deterrence. This, in turn, implies that penalties should be
set, at a minimum, to eliminate any prospect of gain on the
part of the offender. Thus, if the offender’s gain is $100, the
penalty must be no less than $100.
Moreover, this implies that if the conduct is truly
reprehensible, there is no deterrence-based argument for
putting a ceiling on the criminal penalty or the punitive
damages award. The reason for this is that society has no
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interest in permitting reprehensible conduct to persist.
Thus, if the offender is responsible for a reprehensible act
from which he gains $100, there is no deterrence-based
argument against imposing a penalty greater than $100.
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, who cite their law
review article on punitive damages in their brief, have
argued in favor of this position, which reflects the consensus
view. Their article recognizes that where “a reprehensible
act is purely intentional, overdeterrence cannot occur,” 19 and
that the optimal social objective is one of “deterring such
acts completely.” 20 Moreover, that objective, they note,
requires “a measure of damages equal to the greater of gain or
harm.” 21
This is not to say that there are no arguments at all
for limiting the penalty in the case of reprehensible conduct.
One might argue that it makes no sense to fine the offender
$200 if it is clear that he cannot pay it. This is an acceptable
economic argument, but it has nothing to do with the theory
of deterrence, which focuses exclusively on the public
desirability and social utility of deterring the offender’s
conduct. If there is no socially beneficial aspect to the
offender’s harmful conduct, there is no deterrence-based
reason for limiting the penalty applied to it.
III.

THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT IT IS
ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE HARMS TO A TORTFEASOR’S OTHER VICTIMS.

Suppose the offender’s conduct is reprehensible and
he gains $100 from it. Suppose also, that the offender gets
caught by the punishment authority only half of the time he

19

Polinsky and Shavell, 111 HARV. L. REV. at 907 & n.120.

20

Id. at 906.

21

Id. at 918 n.154 (emphasis added).
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engages in offensive conduct. What is the right penalty on
deterrence grounds?
Because the defendant’s conduct is reprehensible, he
should be stripped of the prospect of gaining from it.
Because he is caught only half of the time, the penalty
applied in those cases must strip the offender of the gains he
enjoyed from the times he was not caught. This suggests
that the penalty should be no less than $200 in order to
satisfy the gain-stripping goal that is uniformly understood
to be appropriate under the theory of deterrence.
Increasing the penalty to ensure that the
infrequently-caught offender is stripped of illicit gains – a
policy that has uniformly accepted in the economic
deterrence literature since Bentham – is equivalent (in
economic deterrence terms) to taking into account the
harms done to others by an offender when punishing that
offender. In other words, imposing a penalty of a minimum
of $200, because the offender gets caught only half of the
time, is equivalent to imposing a penalty that compensates
the plaintiff-victim and another victim who is not present
before the court.
Although Petitioner Philip Morris argues that this is
controversial and constitutionally suspect, it is a
fundamental implication of the theory of deterrence. If
punitive damages are to be effective as a deterrent, they
must be allowed to serve this multiplicative function.
Significantly, Professors Polinsky and Shavell do not contest
this point in their brief and there is no disagreement in the
law and economics literature on this proposition.
Indeed, Professors Polinsky and Shavell recognize
and support the use of multipliers in calculating punitive
damage awards. Thus, the core proposition of their law
review article on punitive damages is that “if a defendant can
sometimes escape liability for the harm for which he is responsible,
the proper magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has
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caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the probability of his
escaping liability.” 22 As their first illustration of how a
defendant might escape liability, Professors Polinsky and
Shavell note that
the victim may have difficulty determining
that the harm was the result of some party’s
act – as opposed to simply being the result of
nature, of bad luck.
For instance, an
individual may develop a form of cancer that
could have been caused by exposure to a
naturally occurring carcinogen, such as radon
gas, but which was in fact caused by exposure
to a manmade carcinogen released by the
injurer. 23
Rather strikingly, Professors Polinsky and Shavell
offer a hypothetical that appears to describe this case as their
first illustration of an instance in which it is appropriate to
multiply damages in order to provide the economically
optimal level of deterrence. And Professors Polinsky and
Shavell, after proposing the foregoing hypothetical
anticipating this case, conclude that damages should be
multiplied because “if damages merely equal harm, injurers’
incentives to take precautions will be inadequate and their
incentive to participate in risky activities will be excessive.” 24 Yet
Petitioner now stands before this Court to argue that it is
never appropriate to multiply damages, and that the
damage award should be limited to the harm suffered by the
individual plaintiff.
IV.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME CONTROVERSY ABOUT
WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE TO USE A

22 Polinsky and Shavell, 111 HARV. L. REV.
original).
23

Id. at 888.

24

Id . (emphasis in original).

at 887 (emphasis in
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DEFENDANT’S OVERALL WEALTH IN ASSESSING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THERE IS NO DEBATE THAT IT
IS ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL TO USE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO STRIP AWAY A TORTFEASOR’S ILLICIT
PROFITS OR GAINS.
Perhaps in view of these broad areas of consensus,
Professors Polinsky and Shavell focus in their amicus brief
on a question that, as noted above, is not at issue before this
Court: the role of wealth in determining the size of a
punitive award. Thus, as noted above, Professors Polinsky
and Shavell acknowledge that “the Oregon Supreme Court
eschewed reliance on Philip Morris’ wealth as a basis for
upholding the punitive damages.” 25
Furthermore, Professors Polinsky’s and Shavell’s
discussion of wealth is not only irrelevant to this case but
generally incomplete and therefore not terribly helpful.
Professors Polinsky and Shavell distinguish between
conduct that has a nonmonetary motivation and conduct
that has a monetary motivation. For conduct motivated by
nonmonetary considerations, Polinsky and Shavell argue
that the defendant’s wealth may be an appropriate factor to
take into account in determining the penalty. They offer as
an example the case of an individual who, for spiteful
pleasure, destroys his neighbor’s flower garden. 26 They note
that the wrongdoer should “face a threat of damages that is
sufficiently high to offset the spiteful enjoyment he would
experience from destroying the flower garden. That level of
damages will ordinarily be higher for a wealthy individual
than for a poor one, for dollars usually have less significance
to the wealthy than to the nonwealthy.” 27

25 Brief Amicus Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and
the Cato Institute, at 3.
26

Id. at 7.

27

Id.
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For conduct motivated by monetary considerations,
Professors Polinsky and Shavell argue that the defendant’s
wealth is not an appropriate factor to take into account in
the determination of the penalty. They say that “when a
party’s motivation is monetary, the party will be induced by
the threat of damages to compare the monetary gain he
would obtain from his act against the dollar damages in the
same way regardless of his level of wealth.” 28
Although the distinction Professors Polinsky and
Shavell draw between monetary and nonmonetary motives
and their conclusion with respect to nonmonetary motives is
quite reasonable, their analysis of the case of monetary
motives appears to be incomplete. The analysis of monetary
motives should distinguish between the case in which the
offender’s conduct is reprehensible and the case in which it
is not.
If the offender’s conduct is reprehensible, society has
no interest in allowing it to occur at any scale. It follows,
then, from the theory of deterrence that the penalty should
be at least as large as the minimum of the illicit gain
expected by the offender. Consider a variation of the
example used by Professors Polinsky and Shavell: suppose
the offender steals valuable flowers from his neighbor’s
garden in order to enjoy them from a closer vantage point.
The gain to the offender is the value of the flowers to him:
the maximum amount that he would have been willing to
pay for the flowers. The offender’s maximum willingnessto-pay for the flowers, however, is unquestionably
influenced by his wealth. The wealthy offender will be
willing to pay more for the flowers than will the nonwealthy
offender. Given this, it is entirely appropriate to take the
offender’s wealth into account in determining the optimal
penalty for this case of reprehensible conduct. A penalty
that is set too low would fail to eliminate the illicit gain of
28

Id.
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the offender, and therefore fail to act as a deterrent to theft.
If the offender’s gain, which is equal to the maximum that he
would be willing to pay for the flowers, exceeds the victim’s
loss, setting a penalty equal to the victim’s damages would
be too low to serve as an effective deterrent.
To take another variation, suppose the offender
steals his neighbor’s flowers with the intent to sell them for a
substantial profit. In this case, the offender’s motivation is
clearly monetary. Suppose the flowers are worth $100 to the
victim, but the offender has found an unusually wealthy
buyer who will pay $1000 for the flowers. The appropriate
penalty, in order to completely deter the conduct, is a sum
no less than the offender’s profit, which is $1000. Thus, in
the case in which the offender’s reprehensible conduct is
motivated by a desire for monetary profit, the penalty
should be large enough, at a minimum, to wipe out the
profit gained by the conduct.
If the offender’s conduct is not reprehensible, then
the analysis of Professors Polinsky and Shavell is
appropriate. They offer the following example:
Suppose that an individual could save $100
by not purchasing a safety device. Clearly,
the individual would be induced to spend
$100 on the device if he would have to pay
more than that amount in damages, such as
$200, for failure to do so. And importantly,
the individual would buy the device under
these circumstances whether he is poor or
rich: regardless of his wealth, he would prefer
to spend $100 on the device than to pay $200
in damages. 29
Even in this example, whether the goal of damages
should be gain-stripping or cost-internalization depends on
29

Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
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the nature of the individual’s act. In many cases, failure to
purchase a safety device may not be reprehensible. For
example, the failure of an automobile driver to buy and
install a rear-facing television camera that would permit him
to observe objects behind his car would not be considered a
reprehensible act. If damages are appropriate at all for such
a failure, they should only serve the purpose of cost
internalization. In some cases, however, failure to invest in
safety may be considered reprehensible. Suppose a car
rental firm knows that the steering mechanism on many of
its cars is defective, and yet continues to rent the cars
because it knows from experience that car renters involved
in accidents are unlikely to determine that the defective
steering mechanism caused the accident. In this case, the
goal of the damage award should be to completely deter the
firm’s conduct, which requires setting the damage award at
the greater of the firm’s gain or victim’s loss.
Summing up, the economic theory of deterrence does
not support the argument that wealth should never be a
relevant consideration in the calculus of a punitive damages
award when the defendant’s motives are monetary in
nature. The important distinction is not whether the
defendant’s motivation is monetary; rather, it is whether the
defendant’s conduct is reprehensible. If the offender’s
conduct is reprehensible, deterrence theory suggests that the
appropriate penalty should seek to deter the conduct
completely, which usually requires a penalty that is
sufficiently large to eliminate the prospect of gain to the
offender. In some cases, such a penalty will depend, at least
in part, on the wealth of the offender or the profitability of
his misconduct. 30
V.

THE ONLY TROUBLING ISSUES RAISED BY THIS CASE
AND BY STATE FARM ARE QUESTIONS OF

30 As discussed above, the size of the optimal punitive damages
award may also depend on the likelihood that the offender’s conduct will
be detected and that a civil suit will be successfully prosecuted.
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APPLICATION AND DETAIL, NOT QUESTIONS OF
BASIC ECONOMIC THEORY.
The basic economic theory of deterrence is largely
settled, and the common law regarding punitive awards in
many states is rather consistent with the theory. 31 Thus,
following this Court’s statement in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. 32 that “[i]t is appropriate to consider
the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's
conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the
wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm
to other victims that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred,” many states permit courts to
take into account the actual and potential harm to nonparties
in setting a punitive damages award. 33 Many states also
permit courts to examine the wealth of the offender 34 and
the profitability of his conduct in setting such awards. 35
These are all basic considerations in the rational design of
punishment for deterrence purposes, and a decision by this
Court prohibiting courts from taking such factors into
account would effectively destroy the deterrent effect of
punitive damages.

31

Hylton, 87 GEO. L. J. at 445-60.

32

509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993).

33 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Security Finance Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., ___ P.3d
___, 2006 WL 1836019, *8 (Okla. 2006); Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v.
ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 452 (Kan. 2006); Sweet v. Roy, 801 A.2d 694, 715
(Vt. 2002).

See, e.g., Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., 113 P.3d 63, 78
(Cal. 2005); Frazier v. Badger, 603 S.E.2d 587, 593 (S.C. 2004); Vendelin v.
Costco Wholesale Corp., 95 P.3d 34, 51 (Idaho 2004); Darcars Motors of Silver
Springs, Inc. v. Borzym, 841 A.2d 828, 843 (Md. 2004).
34

35 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1253 (N.J.
2006); Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 1836019 at *7; Johnson v. Ford Motor
Co., 113 P.3d 82, 93 (Cal. 2005); Marie Deonier & Associates v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 101 P.3d 742, 749 (Mont. 2004).
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Whatever troubling issues may be raised by this case
and by State Farm are questions of application and detail, not
questions of basic economic theory. In this case, the punitive
award was apparently designed to substantially reduce
much of the gains Philip Morris had enjoyed from
intentionally defrauding many Oregon consumers over
many years, deliberate misconduct that had the additional
consequence of killing many of the defrauded consumers. 36
In terms of the economic theory of deterrence, the
Oregon court’s approach toward the punitive damages
award appears to be entirely appropriate. Fraud is a classic
example of reprehensible conduct.
Given this, the
appropriate response is to set a penalty that not only deters
the misconduct but deters it completely An award that
wipes out the gain to the offender from defrauding a
particular consumer is the least that can be done.
Moreover, when the offender is caught, prosecuted,
and punished infrequently, deterrence theory counsels that
the award should seek to wipe out the illicit gains enjoyed
by defrauding many consumers. This is apparently the
approach that the Oregon courts have taken in this case. As
a matter of theory, there is nothing controversial or
questionable about this approach.
As noted above, whatever troubling issues are raised
by a case of this type are matters of application and factual
detail. Perhaps the named plaintiff or the other alleged
fraud victims never received or did not really rely on the
mass-marketed fraudulent statements. Perhaps the alleged
tortfeasor never sold products in a particular state. Perhaps
the allegedly fraudulent statements were not misleading at
all. At bottom, although these kinds of issues may lie at the
core of a particular lawsuit, they have little to do with the
36 The $79.5 punitive damage award represented approximately twoand-a-half weeks of Philip Morris’s annual profits in the year in which the
verdict was rendered.
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fundamental design and function of punitive damages.
However, details matter greatly in the real world
implementation of any theory.
Consider the issue of penalizing a tortfeasor for the
harms suffered by other victims of its fraudulent conduct.
How can punitive damages serve a deterrent purpose, and
at the same time prevent defendants from being forced to
pay a penalty for victims who may not exist?
On one hand, one could argue, consistent with
deterrence theory, that this is not an issue that should
trouble a court. If the defendant has been found guilty of
reprehensible conduct, it should suffer a penalty that
completely deters such conduct. The penalty should be, at a
minimum, sufficient to eliminate the gain from that
misconduct. If it happens to be larger than that minimum,
that is not “a problem” from the perspective of deterrence
theory. The reason is that if the conduct is reprehensible,
there is no risk of “overdeterring” the conduct. In other
words, there is no cost to society from over-deterring fraud
or theft.
On the other hand, in view of the possibility of
courtroom errors, there is a risk that punishing conduct that
has been deemed fraudulent might overdeter legitimate or
even desirable conduct. Overdeterrence, in the context of
products, is observed in instances in which products that
consumers desire are withdrawn from the market or sold at
excessive prices. Although this hypothetical risk is noted in
the Polinsky-Shavell brief, given that cigarettes have no
social benefit whatsoever one might certainly question
whether society loses anything at all if damage awards force
cigarette sellers to raise their prices, (Many empirical studies
indicate that cigarette price increases reduce cigarette
consumption, to the benefit of the public’s health). 37 Finally,
37

Issues

See Congressional Budget Office, The Proposed Tobacco Settlement:
From
A
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Perspective,
at
3
(April
1998)
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although the possibility that a series of excessive damage
awards might overdeter legitimate and socially useful
conduct might be a valid concern in some cases, the
applicability of this point is highly attenuated in the special
case of cigarettes.
The best answer to the hypothetical problem of
overdeterrence is not to eliminate punitive awards
altogether or to disallow consideration and disgorgement, of
a defendant’s illicit profits – which would be the practical
effect of refusing to permit courts to penalize the defendant
for harms done to victims other than a named plaintiff – but
to allow the jury to be informed about earlier awards or to
authorize the court to provide offsets for successive punitive
damage awards. 38

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/4xx/doc407/tobacco.pdf (“Considerable
research supports the proposition that increasing the price of cigarettes
would be the most effective way to reduce their use.”).
38 Another possible solution might be to permit the defendant to offer
statistical evidence that the award is excessive, perhaps because of the rare
or unique nature of the victim’s harm. In a case in which the defendant
has been found guilty of engaging in reprehensible conduct, it should not
be the plaintiff’s or the court’s responsibility to prove that the award is not
excessive. It is the defendant who has been found guilty of reprehensible
conduct, and it should be solely his burden, after such a finding, to
present evidence sufficient to persuade a court that a punitive award is
excessive. This is an appropriate balance that preserves the deterrent
function of punitive damages, and at the same time permits defendants to
persuade courts that certain awards should be reduced or eliminated
because of excessiveness.

If the responsibility is placed on the plaintiff or on the court to
prove that a particular award is not excessive in a case in involving
reprehensible conduct, then it will become unlikely that punitive awards
will be able in practice to serve the deterrent function suggested by
theory. Individuals who engage in reprehensible conduct will know that
even though they face the theoretical risk of a punitive award, in practice
it is unlikely that any plaintiff or court will be able cost-effectively to
produce evidence that proves that the award should withstand scrutiny
on appeal. And indeed, the individual engaged in reprehensible conduct
would have every incentive to take steps to obscure the record and
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CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the Oregon Supreme Court did not rely
on Petitioner Philip Morris’s wealth in undertaking its de
novo review of the jury’s award of punitive damages against
that company, and insofar as Professors Polinsky and
Shavell have not identified and we have not found any
reason in law and economics theory to believe that the
Oregon Supreme Court incorrectly applied law and
economics principles – especially deterrence theory – in
upholding of the punitive damage award in this case, amici
respectfully submit that there is no reason why that court’s
judgment should not be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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prevent potential plaintiffs from producing sufficient evidence to uphold
a punitive award. In the case of reprehensible conduct this would
produce a set of perverse incentives in which bad actors can reasonably
expect to prevail, in the sense that the penalties assessed by the courts will
almost always be insufficient to wipe out their illicit profits. But the
situation should be the reverse: those who engage in reprehensible
conduct should expect to lose.
Moreover, those who engage in
reprehensible conduct should be aware that it will be their burden to
prove that a punitive award, that seems appropriate to the court on the
basis of the evidence introduced in the case, is excessive, rather than the
plaintiff’s burden to produce additional evidence to support the award.
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